Abstract The marksmanship contest game with random termination is a fundamental two-person game of timing under an uncertain environment. In this paper, we formulate a unified marksmanship contest game with random termination and show that it can be further classified into five different games. We derive the optimal solutions of these games of timing, which are categorized into the Nash equilibrium strategy and the Stackelberg strategy. Our results involve the well-known results by Teraoka (1983) and Baston and Garnaev (1995) as special cases and at the same time give new insights for different types of game.
Introduction
The game of timing is a fundamental tool to determine the best timing for players with conflict of interests. The duel game, which is the representative example of two-person game of timing, is formulated as the problem in which two rival players determine the best timings of fire to win. In general, duel games can be categorized into two types: zero-sum duel game and nonzero-sum duel game. The zero-sum duel game is formulated to describe the situation where the sum of payoffs for two players is always constant. On the other hand, the nonzero-sum duel game is modeled as the game where the sum of rewards for both players is not constant. During the last four decades, a number of duel games have been analyzed in the literature.
Dresher [4] and Karlin [9] introduced some results of simplest duel games in which each player has only one bullet. Restorepo [11] considered a silent-type game in which Player 1 possesses m bullets and Player 2 possesses n bullets. Fox and Kimeldorf [6] analyzed a noisy-type duel game, where each player has a different number of bullets in a fashion similar to the work by Restorepo [11] . Epstein [5] summarized features of strategies of the above duel games. Teraoka [17, 20] modeled the duel games where both players do not know whether there exist bullets in their gun or not. Teraoka [19] also dealt with a duel game where each duelist has an incomplete knowledge on the kind of opponent's bullet fitted to their guns. Kurisu [10] considered a duel game with equal accuracy functions. In his game, Player 1 has one noisy bullet and one silent bullet, and has to fire the noisy one first. On the other hand, Player 2 has only one silent bullet. Hendricks et al. [8] presented a general analysis of the war of attrition which is a type of game of timing in continuous time with complete information. More recently, the different models of the war of attrition were considered by Hamers [7] and Baston and Garnaev [2] .
As an application of the game of timing, Sakaguchi [12] considered a cardinal game which is called marksmanship contest game. Since the seminal work by Sakaguchi [12] , this type of game has been analyzed by some authors. Teraoka [21] modeled both silent-type and noisy-type marksmanship contest games with random termination for two players. The strategy which was derived as a solution of the game is the equilibrium strategy for both players, who have no motivation to change only their own strategies. However, it should be noted that both players have to choose their strategies, since the strategy derived by Teraoka [21] is an innumerable Nash equilibrium strategy. On the other hand, Baston and Garnaev [1] considered the similar but somewhat different silent-type game from [21] by taking a different expected total profit function in the case where both players fire at simultaneous time into consideration. Baston and Garnaev [1] showed that their game has a unique Nash equilibrium strategy. Furthermore, Teraoka [22] considered silent/noisy-type marksmanship contest games and derive their associated solutions.
In this paper, we formulate a unified marksmanship contest game which includes the previous games considered by Teraoka [21, 22] and Baston and Garnaev [1] , referred to as silent-type Teraoka game, noisy-type Teraoka game, silent-type Baston and Garnaev game, as special cases. We show that our formulation splits into five different marksmanship contest games. The first four games are called silent-type Teraoka-Baston/Garnaev game, noisy-type Teraoka-Baston/Garnaev game, bonus game, and silent/noisy-type TeraokaBaston/Garnaev game, and can be characterized as two-person nonzero-sum games of timing. The last game is the Stackelberg game [15] with two players; leader and follower. In this game, the follower has to wait for the leader's action, and reacts by choosing the best strategy consistent with the available information. It is well known that the Stackelberg game can be applied in several applications [3, 13, 14, 23] . In this paper we also characterize the Stackelberg strategy for the marksmanship contest game.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give the mathematical preliminary for a fundamental marksmanship contest game with random termination and define the Nash equilibrium strategy. In Section 3, we summarize the existing results for three different marksmanship contest games (silent-type Teraoka game, noisy-type Teraoka game, silent-type Baston and Garnaev game) in [1, 21] . Section 4 is devoted to formulate a unified marksmanship contest game with random termination which splits into five different games (silent-type Teraoka-Baston/Garnaev game, noisy-type Teraoka-Baston/Garnaev game, bonus game, silent/noisy-type Teraoka-Baston/Garnaev game, Stackelberg game). We derive the solutions of respective marksmanship contest games analytically. In Section 5, we give simple numerical examples on the game solutions. Finally the paper is concluded with some remarks in Section 6.
Model Description
In the marksmanship contest game, suppose that there are two rival players in the marksmanship contest, and that each player has a gun with one bullet. We call them Player 1 and Player 2. The distance between each player and his or her own target is one unit length. Two players move to the target with unit speed, and fire at an arbitrary time (or an arbitrary point) t ∈ [0, 1]. The player who first hits the target is recognized as the winner, so the winner can receive unit reward from an umpire of the contest. Once the winner is decided, the contest ends. Here, we define the profit of each game when both players hit their own targets at simultaneous time individually. The accuracy function A i (t) (i = 1, 2) represents the probability that Player i hits when he or she fires at time t. Let A i (t) be the function satisfying A i (0) = 0 and A i (1) = 1. Furthermore, suppose that this contest is to be terminated at a random time T ∈ [0, 1] following the continuous probability distribution function H(t) which satisfies H(0) = 0 and H(1) = 1. The functions A i (t) and H(t) are continuous, strictly increasing and differentiable with respect to t. Of course, each player wishes to delay to fire in order to get the higher probability to win. However, they have to decide the shooting time taking the existence of rival player and random termination into consideration.
We define the following equation:
where K i (t) represents the probability that the game has not finished yet and Player i hits the target first. We assume that K i (t) is a unimodal function of t and has a unique maximum point m i such as
There are two types of marksmanship contest game. If a player knows the time of opponent's action as soon as it takes place, then it is said that the opponent's player has a noisy bullet. In this paper, we call this game noisy-type game. On the other hand, if each player cannot know whether his or her opponent has acted or not, we say that both players have silent bullets. This game is called silent-type game.
For silent-type game, let (x, y) denote the pure strategies expressing the timings of actions for Player 1 and Player 2, respectively. Also, let M i (x, y) be the expected total profit for Player i (= 1, 2) when Player 1 and Player 2 act at time x and y, respectively. Here, let (X, Y ) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1] be the set of pure strategy for each Player i (= 1, 2). Define the mixed strategy for each player:
This implies that Player i triggers the action at a random timing with the probability distribution function F i . If Player i takes the mixed strategy F i , then the expected total profit for Player i is given by
where has not yet acted before time y. Let (F i , r i ) be a mixed strategy such that Player i shoots at a random time with F i if Player 3 − i (i = 1, 2) has not acted yet and shoots at a fixed time r i if Player 3 − i has already acted and failed under the condition that Player i has not acted yet. Nash equilibrium strategies and value functions can be defined in a similar way to silent-type game. Therefore, the challenge here is to find the Nash equilibrium strategies and their associated value functions.
3. Related Work 3.1. Teraoka's strategy for silent-type game Teraoka [21] models a two-person game of timing with random termination which is called two-person nonzero-sum marksmanship contest game. For better understanding of our results, we summarize the results in [21] . Note that Teraoka [21] focuses on the both types of marksmanship contest game. In the silent-type game, Teraoka [21] formulates the expected total profit as follows.
In this paper, the game which has the expected total profit functions represented by Equations (3.1) and (3.2) is called Silent-type Teraoka game. For any a satisfying F i (a) = 0, let
where
and a i (i = 1, 2) is the unique root a of the equation:
Teraoka [21] derives the following mixed strategy in the silent-type Teraoka game: where a = max(a 1 , a 2 ), (3.8) (i = 1, 2) represent the mass part of Player i's mixed strategy. In [21] , the value functions satisfying Equations (2.8) and (2.9) are given by
(3.11)
So Teraoka [21] proves that the Nash equilibrium strategy which is shown by Equations (3.6) and (3.7), with the value functions in Equation (3.11) are the solution of the silenttype Teraoka game.
Teraoka's strategy for noisy-type game
In the noisy-type game, Teraoka [21] formulates the expected total profit as follows.
where M i ((x, r 1 (y)), (y, r 2 (x))) is the expected total profit for Player i and r i (t) is the best reaction timing for Player i when Player 3 − i shoots at time t first. The game which has the expected total profit functions represented by Equations (3.12) and (3.13) is called Noisy-type Teraoka game. Note that each player can shoot at the best timing r i (t) in the situation where the opponent's player has already shot and failed. Define 
, we also define a function θ i (t) as follows:
Teraoka [21] derives the following function in b < m for the noisy-type Teraoka game:
and [b 0 , c] is any subset of (b, m]. With these functions, the Nash equilibrium strategy is given by a pair of ((F * 1 , m 1 ), (F * 2 , m 2 )), and the value functions are given by
(3.20)
On the other hand, Teraoka [21] gives the Nash equilibrium strategy ((F * 1 , m 1 ), (F * 2 , m 2 )) in b ≥ m for the noisy-type Teraoka game, where
If m = m 2 , then the value functions are given by
(3.24)
Baston and Garnaev's strategy for silent-type game
Baston and Garnaev [1] consider a somewhat different game of the silent-type Teraoka game.
In the silent-type game, they introduce a slightly different expected total profit as follows. (3.26) where P i (t) (i = 1, 2) is the function satisfying the condition: 0 ≤ P i (t) < K i (t). In this paper, the game which has the expected total profit functions represented by Equations (3.25) and (3.26) is called Silent-type Baston/Garnaev game. Compared with the silenttype Teraoka game, each player in the silent-type Baston/Garnaev game gains the cheaper profit in the situation where both players hit their own target at the same time.
Define a * i ∈ [0, m i ] which is the unique root of the equation in the case of m = m i :
Baston and Garnaev [1] derive the following mixed strategy: where
In the above solution, the value functions satisfying Equations (2.8) and (2.9) are given by
(3.31)
Baston and Garnaev [1] show that the silent-type Baston/Garnaev game has the unique Nash equilibrium strategy.
Remark 3.1. The Nash equilibrium strategy for the silent-type Teraoka game is a mixed strategy in which only one player has the mass part. On the other hand, the Nash equilibrium strategy for the silent-type Baston/Garnaev game is a mixed strategy in which both players might have the mass parts at different time m i .
Unified Marksmanship Contest Game 4.1. Silent-type Teraoka-Baston/Garnaev game
Corresponding to the previous study [1, 21] , we define
for the game with Equations (3.25) and (3.26), and derive the Nash equilibrium strategy for a unified game which contains both Teraoka game and Baston/Garnaev game. This game is equivalent to the silent-type Baston/Garnaev game in the case of 0 ≤ P i (t) < K i (t) and the silent-type Teraoka game in the case of P i (t) = K i (t). The game which contains both games is called Silent-type Teraoka-Baston/Garnaev game in this paper. In Subsection 4.3 later, we will also consider the game in the case of
In Equations (2.6) and (2.7), the first-order conditions of optimality are given by
We suppose that there exists the first derivative of the mixed strategies F i satisfying Equations (4.1) and (4.2), i.e., 
Proof. For i = 1 and 0 < a < m 1 , we have 5) due to the integration by parts. Since
the result follows and the proof is completed.
Lemma 4.2.
For the silent-type Teraoka-Baston/Garnaev game, the function which satisfies the first-order conditions of optimality is given by
By differentiating Equation (4.9) with respect to x and setting it equal to zero, we have
Integrating both sides of Equation (4.10) yields
where d is the constant of integration. By substituting x = a into Equations (4.10) and (4.11), we have d = K 1 (a). The proof for Player 2 is made in the similar way. The proof is completed. 
holds, the Nash equilibrium strategy for each player is given by
12)
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The value functions for respective players are given by 
holds, the Nash equilibrium strategy for each player is given by The value functions of both players are given by
Proof. For i = 1 and Player 1, we consider four cases;
In Case (i), from Equations (2.6) and (3.25), we have
In Case (ii),
The function M 1 (x, F * 2 ) is constant for the range of a ≤ x < m, since F * 2 satisfies the first-order conditions of optimality. Substituting x = a into Equation (4.20) leads to
In Case (iii), from Equation (4.16), we obtain M 1 (x, F * 2 ) as follows.
In Case (iv), we have
From the property of K 1 (x), Equation (4.23) has the maximum value at x = m 1 , and
We show that Equation (4.24) is not greater than K 1 (a). In the case of a = a * 2 , from Lemma 4.1, we obtain
On the other hand, in the case of a = a 1 , since λ(a 1 ) < 0 from Lemma 4.1, we have
From the above cases (i)-(iv), it is shown for all x that
In the case of a = a * 2 , the game value is given by
Finally, in the case of a = a 1 , γ
equals to zero from Equations (3.5) and (4.17), so we find
(4.29)
Since the case for Player 2 is similar, the proof is completed.
It can be easily checked that the strategies which are shown in Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 are the Nash equilibrium strategy for silent-type Baston/Garnaev game. Since the silent-type Baston/Garnaev game has a unique Nash equilibrium strategy, it can be easily checked that these solutions are also unique Nash equilibrium strategy for silent-type Teraoka-Baston/Garnaev game.
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Noisy-type Teraoka-Baston/Garnaev game
In this subsection, we consider the noisy-type game. Define the expected total profit of this game as follows. Similar to Subsection 4.1, we define P i (t) satisfying 0 ≤ P i (t) ≤ K i (t) in Equations (4.30) and (4.31). Note that Baston and Garnaev [1] did not consider the noisy-type game. Hereafter, we call the game which has above conditions Noisy-type Teraoka-Baston/Garnaev game in this paper. In a similar fashion to the silent-type game, we will consider the game in the case of
For the noisy-type game, the first-order conditions of optimality are given by
Lemma 4.3. For the noisy-type Teraoka-Baston/Garnaev game, the strategy F * i (t) (i = 1, 2) which satisfies the first-order conditions of optimality is given by 
Proof. When Player 1 shoots at x ∈ [b, c], we obtain
From Equation (4.32), we have
Integrating both sides of Equation (4.36) with respect to x yields
where η is the constant of integration. By substituting t = b into Equation (4.37), we get η = 1. The proof for Player 2 is made in the similar way. The proof is completed. 
The value functions for respective players are given by
The proof is omitted for brevity from the similar argument in Theorem 4.1. 
and c ≤ m. The value functions of both players are given by
Proof. In the case where Player 2 takes the Nash equilibrium strategy, we calculate the expected total profit for Player 1 as follows. Also, in the case where Player 1 takes the Nash equilibrium strategy, the expected total profit for Player 2 is given by Hence, it is shown for all x and y that
The value functions of both players are given by
The proof is completed. 
Proof. For i = 1, the expected total profit for Player 1 is given by
On the other hand, the expected total profit for Player 2 is also given by
(4.55)
Hence, it can be shown for all x and y that
shown in Theorem 4.3. Therefore, under the same condition, the strategies that Player 1 and Player 2 always shoot at time m 1 and m 2 respectively are the Nash equilibrium strategies in both silent-type game and noisy-type game. In the silenttype Teraoka-Baston/Garnaev game, we derive the Nash equilibrium strategy as a mixed strategy. On the other hand, in the noisy-type Teraoka-Baston/Garnaev game, there exists the Nash equilibrium strategy in which one player takes a pure strategy and the other player takes a mixed strategy as shown in Theorem 4.4 and Theorem 4.5. Furthermore, we can see that the Nash equilibrium strategy in the noisy-type Teraoka-Baston/Garnaev game is not a unique solution unlike in the case of the silent-type Teraoka-Baston/Garnaev game. In the above discussion, we did not give the solutions in the case b 1 = b 2 of noisy-type Teraoka-Baston/Garnaev game. However, this situation occurs only in a very limited case where two players have the absolutely same accuracy function.
Bonus game
The results of Subsection 4.1 and Subsection 4.2 concern the solutions of the game with the condition of 0 ≤ P i (t) ≤ K i (t). Here, we derive the solutions of games with the expected total profits represented by Equations (3.25), (3.26), (4.30) and (4.31) under the condition of P i (t) > K i (t). The former game is called Silent-type bonus game and the latter game is called Noisy-type bonus game. The strategy given in Theorem 4.6 and Theorem 4.7 holds regardless of the type of games. Therefore, we focus on only the silent-type strategy in this subsection. Suppose that P i (t) is a unimodal function which is maximum at time m i , similar to the function K i (t) (P i (0) = P i (1) = 0). Define the parameters ρ i and σ i as follows. 
hold, then the Nash equilibrium strategies for respective players are given by
and the value functions are given by
hold, then the Nash equilibrium strategies and their associated value functions are given by 
hold, then the Nash equilibrium strategies and their associated value functions are given by
holds, then the Nash equilibrium strategies and their associated value functions are given by
where t * is an arbitrary time satisfying ρ ≤ t * ≤ σ. 
It turns out that the solutions given in Theorem 4.6, Theorem 4.7 and Theorem 4.8 are actually the Nash equilibrium strategies. Therefore, the proofs of Theorem 4.6, Theorem 4.7 and Theorem 4.8 are omitted. In the bonus game, each player gets the more profit when both players shoot at the same time, so each player tends to take a pure strategy which is a deterministic action at the same time. In the case (iv) of Theorem 4.6, both strategies which are shown by Equations (4.73), (4.74) and Equations (4.77), (4.78) are the Nash equilibrium strategies. Also, all strategies that both players fire at the same time t * satisfying ρ ≤ t * ≤ σ are the Nash equilibrium strategies as shown in the case (ii) of Theorem 4.7. It is clearly shown that there exists innumerable Nash equilibrium strategies. Furthermore, we can show the Nash equilibrium strategy which is a mixed strategy for the silent-type bonus game in Theorem 4. 
Silent/Noisy-type Teraoka-Baston/Garnaev game
In this subsection, we consider the silent/noisy-type game. Suppose that Player 1 has a silent bullet and Player 2 has a noisy bullet. Therefore, Player 1 notices the opponent's action as soon as it takes place. On the other hand, Player 2 cannot know whether Player 1 has acted or not. Let ((x, r 1 (y)), y) denote the pure strategies for Player 1 and Player 2. Define the expected total profit of this game as follows. (4.93) where M i ((x, r 1 (y)), y) means the expected total profit for Player i, and P i (t) satisfies 0 ≤ P i (t) ≤ K i (t). Teraoka [22] considers the silent/noisy-type marksmanship contest game with random termination when P i (t) = K i (t). We call this game with the above condition Silent/Noisy-type Teraoka-Baston/Garnaev game in this paper. 
It is evident to see that the solutions in Theorem 4.9 are actually the Nash equilibrium strategies. Therefore, the proof is omitted. 
We omit the proof, since we have already shown the similar results in Theorem 4.1.
Stackelberg strategy solution for marksmanship contest game with random termination
In this subsection, we consider a Stackelberg marksmanship contest game with random termination. In this game, we assume that there are leader and follower players. That is, there are superiority and inferiority between two players. Suppose that the leader can shoot earlier than the follower, and that the follower can act only at the same timing as the leader's shot or after. In this game, the expected total profit functions are given by Equations (3.25) and (3.26). We focus on the case of P i (t) = K i (t).
Let Player 1 and Player 2 be the follower and the leader, respectively. For an arbitrary y ∈ [0, 1], we define the function f : [0, 1] → [0, 1] satisfying the condition:
(4.102)
If there exists an arbitrary y * ∈ [0, 1] which satisfies the condition: 
so, the leader can obtain the expected profit not less than the value function under the Nash equilibrium strategy. This means that the Stackelberg game is more profitable for the leader player. Let J i j be the expected profit of Player j (= 1, 2) in the case where Player i (= 1, 2) is the leader, so we define
Theorem 4.11. The Stackelberg strategies for Player 2 as the leader are given by
where b 1 and m 2 are already defined in Equations (3.15) and (2.2), respectively. The optimal payoffs for respective players are given by Theorem 4.12. In the Stackelberg marksmanship contest game with random termination, the following conditions always hold.
(4.110) Therefore, the Stackelberg marksmanship contest game with random termination is competitive in the sense that both players wish to become the leader.
Remark 4.1. The Nash equilibrium strategies in Theorem 4.10 are equivalent to the solutions (x * , y * ) in Theorem 4.11. That is, under the condition of b 1 ≥ m 2 , the actions of the leader and the follower in the Stackelberg game correspond to those of the noisy and silent players in the silent/noisy-type game. In the Nash equilibrium strategy, Player 1 does not have motivation to shot before time b 1 . On the other hand, Player 2 always wishes to shot at time m 2 . Consequently, the order of actions for two players is uniquely determined.
Numerical Examples
In this section, we give simple numerical examples. First, we derive the Nash equilibrium strategies and value functions for both silent-type and noisy-type Teraoka-Baston/Garnaev games. The model parameters for two players are given in Table 1 . For example, we label the game with the condition: A 1 (t) = t, A 2 (t) = t, H(t) = t as Case 1 as shown in Table  1 . Here, the accuracy function A i (t) represents the probability that Player i hits his or her own target when Player i fires at time t. Therefore, we assume that the player who has the good accuracy function; A i (t) = −(t − 1) 2 + 1 can be regarded as an advanced contestant. If the player has the normal accuracy function; A i (t) = t, then he or she is an intermediate contestant. Furthermore, the player with the poor accuracy function; A i (t) = t 2 is regarded as a beginner. Also, it is seen that the game with the condition: H(t) = −(t − 1) 2 + 1 is easy to terminate. On the other hand, the condition: H(t) = t 2 means that this game tends to continue further more. Table 2 presents the support range and value function in the silent-type Teraoka-Baston/ Garnaev game, where the underline denotes the supports of a and m. From Table 1 and  Table 2 , we can see that Player 2 has always better skills of shooting than Player 1. Therefore, the value function of Player 2 is greater than that of Player 1. Furthermore, we find that both players tend to get more profit if the game has the good condition relevant to the function H(t) from Case 1, Case 3 and Case 7 of Table 2 . Figure 1 shows the behavior of the Nash equilibrium strategy in the silent-type Teraoka-Baston/Garnaev game with parameters in Case 2. From this figure, we observe that only one player takes the Nash equilibrium strategy with probability mass part in the silent-type Teraoka-Baston/Garnaev game. Table 3 presents the support range and value function in the noisy-type Teraoka-Baston/ Garnaev game, where the underline denotes the supports of b and m. From Table 2 and  Table 3 , it is seen that the value functions of the noisy-type game are always greater than those of the silent-type game in the same case. These results arise from superiority condition of the noisy-type game for two players. As mentioned in Subsection 4.2, we did not give the solutions in the case b 1 = b 2 of the noisy-type game. Therefore, we show only the results when b 1 ̸ = b 2 in Table 3 . Figure 2 shows the behavior of the Nash equilibrium strategy in the noisy-type Teraoka-Baston/Garnaev game with parameters in Case 2, where c = m − 0.05. From this figure, we observe that only one player takes the Nash equilibrium strategy which is a mixed strategy in the noisy-type Teraoka-Baston/Garnaev game. Furthermore, it is seen that the player who takes a mixed strategy is able to select the support of their own strategy freely. Next we compare the Nash equilibrium strategy in the silent/noisy-type Teraoka-Baston/ Garnaev game with the Stackelberg strategy. In Case A and Case B, the model parameters are given by A 1 (t) = t, A 2 (t) = t 2 , H(t) = t and A 1 (t) = t 3 , A 2 (t) = t, H(t) = −(t − 1) 2 + 1, respectively. Suppose that Player 1 as a silent player and Player 2 as a noisy player exist in the silent/noisy game, and that Player 1 as a follower and Player 2 as a leader exist in the Stackelberg game. Table 4 presents the value function and the optimal payoff in two games. From this table, we can see that Player 2 of the Stackelberg game can get more expected profit than the value function in the silent/noisy game in both cases. Since the condition b 1 ≥ m 2 holds in Case B, it is seen that the strategies of two games are equivalent, as shown in Remark 4.1, and that each player obtains the same value of the expected profit in the both games. Figures 3 and 4 show the behavior of Nash equilibrium strategy and Stackelberg Figure 3 , we observe that both players of the silent/noisy-type game have to act earlier than the Stackelberg game under the condition of b 1 < m 2 . From Figure 4 , it can be seen that the strategy of the silent player is equivalent to that of the follower, and that the strategy of the noisy player is equivalent to that of the leader under the condition of b 1 ≥ m 2 .
Conclusion
In this paper, we have formulated a unified marksmanship contest game with random termination and shown that our formulation split into five different marksmanship contest games. The first four games can be characterized as two-person nonzero-sum games of timing. The last game is the Stackelberg game with two players. The solutions of respective marksmanship contest games have been derived analytically under some conditions. Through simple numerical examples, we have confirmed the detailed behaviors of solutions which were the Nash equilibrium strategies or the Stackelberg strategies.
